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The instant case seems to impose "impossible standards" 45 on the
drafting of valid obscenity legislation, and denies the operation
of the "genuine construction" rule of the Criminal Code. Such a
construction seemingly runs contrary to the obvious intent and
purpose of the legislation, and it is submitted that a more reasonable construction of such statutes will better serve to accord
them their appropriate scope, and to fulfill the objectives of legislative design.
James A. George

MINERAL RIGHTS-

ALIENATION OF MINERALS BY STATE
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS AND AGENCIES

Plaintiff instituted a concursus proceeding to determine the
ownership of proceeds from the production of oil and gas on
the land in question. A dispute over the ownership of the minerals existed between the claimant school board and the claimant
Harrison. The school board acquired the property by purchase,
and by mesne conveyances the title ultimately descended to
Harrison. In the deeds the minerals were neither excepted nor
mentioned. Harrison executed an oil, gas, and mineral lease to
plaintiff, and about one year later, claimant school board executed a similar lease to plaintiff. The trial court determined
that the school board was included within the ambit of Article
IV, Section 2, of the State Constitution of 1921, which provides
that mineral rights sold by the state shall be reserved and thus
by virtue of the constitutional provision could not alienate the
minerals on any land it sold. Therefore, the State of Louisiana,
through its agent the school board, was found to be the owner
of the minerals. The court of appeal reversed and on review by
the Louisiana Supreme Court, held, judgment of the court of
appeal affirmed. The constitutional. provision of Article IV, Section 2, applies to the "state" only and not to a political subdivision or state agency. Thus the sale of the land included the
mineral rights since the latter were not expressly reserved by
the school board. Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 115 So.2d
373 (1959).
The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 in Article IV, Section 2,
provides: "In all cases the mineral rights on any and all property
45. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957).
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sold by the state shall be reserved."' (Emphasis added.) The
scope of application of this article turns on the meaning to be
given to the word "state"; more specifically, does the word state
include state agencies, 2 such as school boards, or is it limited
to the state in its sovereign capacity. This provision of the Constitution has been construed in only two cases, both involving
conveyances by levee boards. In State ex rel. Board of Commi8sioners of Tensas Basin Levee District v. Grace,3 the Tensas
Levee Board sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Registrar
of the State Land Office and the Auditor to certify certain lands
granted by the legislature to the levee board in its act of creation. The Registrar and Auditor refused to certify the conveyance, contending that the land grant was partially revoked by
Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution of 1921. The court in
granting the mandamus held that Article IV, Section 2, did not
revoke the conveyance because the transfer of the land to the
levee district would not be parting with the land within the
meaning of that section, but was only a placing of the land
under the control of a state agency for the purpose of constructing and maintaining levees. The court pointed out that,
therefore, the prohibition in Article IV, Section 2, against the
inclusion of minerals in sales of state land did not apply to
lands conveyed by the state to the levee district. In a subsequent
case, Board of Commissioners of the Caddo Levee District v.
Pure Oil Co.,4 the Caddo Levee Board, as lessor, filed suit
against the lessee for royalties resulting from oil production
on the leased premises. To the defendant's plea of three years
prescription, the plaintiff contended that prescription does not
run against a levee board because it is a state agency. The court
stated that "if the question presented involved the loss by prescription 5 of the mineral rights themselves we should most likely
hold, that since the levee district must retain such mineral rights,
it could not lose them by prescription, for a state agency cannot
lose by prescription that which it must retain. However, no such
1. LA. CONST. art. IV, § 2. Cf. Barnett v. State Mineral Board, 193 La.
1055, 192 So. 701 (1939). In this case the court held that the state legislature
can convey the property and the minerals to a state agency such as a levee board
without violating Article IV, § 2.
2. See State v. Standard Oil Co., 164 La. 334, 113 So. 867 (1927). This case
defines state agency, holding that it is any subdivision incorporated by an act of
the legislature, which has the right to sue and be sued. Thus, levee boards and
school boards are state agencies.
3. 161 La. 1039, 107 So. 830 (1926).
4. 167 La. 801, 120 So. 373 (1929).
5. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3538 (1870). This article provides: "The following actions are prescribed by three years: . . . That for arrearages of rent charge . .. ."
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question is here presented, as our only inquiry is whether the
demand of a levee district for royalties under a lease is pre-

scriptible, and we conclude they are."

(Emphasis added.)

Since the solution of the problem presented by the instant
case depends upon an interpretation of the word "state" in the
Louisiana Constitution, prior judicial constructions are helpful
in determining its meaning. Two cases construing similar provisions lend support by analogy to upholding a conveyance of
minerals by a state agency to an individual. In one case7 the
court held that Article 121 of the Constitution of 18458 which
provided that "the state shall not become a subscriber to the
stock of any corporation, or joint stock company" did not prevent
such subscriptions by parish and municipal corporations. A like

construction was given a similar provision in Article 108 of the
Constitution of 1852. 9
In the instant case the court for the first time was squarely
presented with the issue of whether or not a state agency had

to reserve the minerals on property sold by the agency.' 0 The

court held that "state" as used in Article IV, Section 2, of the
Constitution of 1921 refers only to the state as a sovereign and

not a state agency. Thus the conveyance from the school board
transferred the land and the minerals. To reach this conclusion
the court first reasoned that the term "state" in the Constitution sometimes refers solely to the state in its sovereign character, and at other times includes within its meaning every
agency of the state. Turning to the Constitution the court noted
that in Article IV, Section 12,11 the language used is "the state
6. 167 La. 801, 810, 120 So. 373, 376 (1929).
7. New Orleans v. Graihle, 9 La. Ann. 561 (1854).
8. LA. CONST. art. 121 (1845).
9. Police Jury v. Succession of McDonogh, 8 La. Ann. 341 (1853). La. Const.
art. 108 (1852) - "The state shall not subscribe for the stock of, nor make a loan
to nor pledge its faith for the benefit of any corporation. ..."
A legal principle which supports alienation of minerals by a state agency was
announced by the court in State v. Knop, 190 So, 135, 144 (La. App. 1939):
"Where there is ambiguity, the language of a constitutional amendment must be
interpreted in an effort to carry out the obvious intent, such enactment may not
be broadened or extended by interpretation." Such an interpretation would restrict
the word state in Article IV, § 2, to the state in its sovereign capacity.
10. No cases could be found on the interpretation to be given to the word
shall in Article IV, § 2; however, it is submitted that the direction it gives is
mandatory.
11. LA. COrNST. art. IV, § 12: "The funds, credit, property or things of value
of the state, or of any political corporation thereof, shall not be loaned, pledged,
or granted to or for any person or persons . . .; nor shall the state, nor any
political corporation, purchase or subscribe to the capital or stock of any corporation. . . . Nor shall the state, nor any political corporation thereof, assume the
liabilities of any political . . . association .. " (Emphasis added.)
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or any political corporation," and this same language -is found in
Section 13 of Article IV.12 Comparing these provisions with Section 2 the~court quoted the court of appeal, saying, "a comparison
of the language of Sections 2, 12, and 13 of Article IV leaves it
clear that where the framers intended that the restriction or
limitation should apply to the state only as a separate entity
from its political subdivision, the word state alone was used, but
where the limitation or restriction was intended to apply to the
state and all its political subdivisions thereof, the intent was so
spelled out in terms of 'the state or any political subdivision
thereof.' -Is The court further reasoned that normally in a constitution the word state expresses the combined idea of people,
territory, and government, and should be so construed here. In
considering the two levee board decisions previously discussed,
it was said that any statement construing Article IV, Section 2,
was unnecessary for the decision in those cases and therefore
was dictum.
An examination of the problem presented in the levee board
cases is necessary to determine the effect of the instant case, on
future litigation involving alienation of minerals by state agen4
case the actual issue was the constitutionalcies. In the Grace1
ity of a transfer of state lands from the state to a state agency
without a reservation of the minerals. No problem of alienation
of the minerals by the state agency to a private individual was
presented. However, it seems that the reasoning of the court
concerning alienability of the land was an important link in supporting the decision that the property passed to the agency, for
it brought out that the land, even though transferred' to an
agency, would still belong to the state and could not be further
transferred to an individual without a reservation of the minerals. Looked at in this way a court in a later case might give
more than dictum weight to the pronouncement in the Grace case
concerning alienability of state land by a state agency.
There is some question as to the effect the instant case will
have on future sales by state agencies. It is submitted that the
court has at least settled that a sale without a mineral reserva12. Id. art. IV, § 13: "The legislature shall have no power to release oi extinguish, or to authorize the releasing or extinguishment, in whole or in part, of
the indebtedness, liability or obligation of any corporation or individual to the
State, or to any parish or municipal corporationthereof .... " (Emphasis added.)
13. Stokes v. Harrison, 238 La. 343, 359, 115 So.2d 373, 379 (1959).
14. State er rel. Board of Commissioners of Tensas Basin Levee Dist. v. Grace,
161 La. 1039, 109 So. 830 (1926).
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tion, by a school board, of land purchased by the board from an
individual, will convey both the land and the minerals in the
absence of a mineral exception. Whether or not this same result
will be reached in a case where the land sold was acquired from
the state rather than purchased from an individual is not clear.
When there is a conveyance from the state rather than a purchase from an individual, it is more difficult for the court to
find a separation of the land from the state. This could explain
the position of the court in the Grace case, wherein it held that
putting the property under the control of the levee board would
not be a parting with the property by the state but merely placing it under the control of one of its agencies, and thus the land
would still be the property of the state. This seems especially
true when one considers that the apparent policy behind Article
IV, Section 2, is to prevent the legislature from selling state
lands for an immediate lump sum and to assure future generations at least the mineral revenue from these lands. Due, however, to the language of the court in the instant case, it is submitted that in the future all sales by state agencies and subdivisions will convey the minerals as well as the land unless there
is an express mineral reservation. 15 Such a construction might
create a need for legislative and constitutional change because of
the possibility of abuse by state agencies to avoid the spirit of
the Constitution.
Sam J. Friedman
15. See Louisiana Attorney General Rulings, p. 890 (1942-44). It should be
noted that such a construction was not what the Attorney General considered the
law to be prior to the instant case. In a 1942 opinion by the office of the Attorney
General, it was stated that the State Board of Health could not sell realty acquired by the Greenwell Springs Hospital under will, without reserving the mineral rights to the Tuberculosis Commission as an agency of the state.

